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Switzerland is often viewed as a federalist curiosity
and a unique form of direct democracy.But this view
does not provide a proper understanding of the
country.A theory of Switzerland is necessary.A con-
sideration of the initial, exogenous geographical sit-
uation of Swiss territory provides a better under-
standing of the country’s development. It was out of
the fractured geography that the institutions of fed-
eralism and direct democracy as they are known to-
day developed and established themselves.Although
there was a trend to internal centralisation in the
20th century, the regional authorities have main-
tained their autonomy considerably better in Switzer-
land than in other states.An important factor is that
the federal government, cantons and municipalities
are each responsible for their own finances and
debts.This stabilises not only the budget of regional
and local authorities but also prevents interference
on the part of the central government.
Why is Switzerland so federalist?
In the concert of nations Switzerland is often viewed
as an irritating fiscal exception,as an annoying coun-
try that has chosen a path different from that of the
great fiscal states of the civilized Western world, in
particular different from that of the European Un-
ion.Why can’t Switzerland tax foreign financial and
real capital in the same way as all the other large
nations do? Why is it necessary for the OECD and
the G20 to use political pressure before Switzerland
agrees? One explanation is that Switzerland itself is
not a closed tax system; in many cases the federal
government does not have the power to tax.It rather
lies (as in the case of holding company taxation)
from time immemorial with the cantons. A lack of
federal tax regulations has led to alleged “unfair”tax
competition, which has increased the annoyance of
countries with a large public sector. Swiss tax feder-
alism is gradually being dismantled as a result of
pressure from outside but Switzerland is neverthe-
less still “backward”. France, for example, threat-
ened to strip Switzerland of its sovereign status and
to degrade it to a “territoire non-coopératif”.1
Some theory2
The above does not provide an explanation for the
exceptionalism of Switzerland, it only asks the ques-
tion in a different way.We must now explain how this
“tax backwardness“ arose. The reasons often go back
centuries. Switzerland was never an absolutist state in
which the prince exhausted his local tax power by
using professional tax collectors in a systematic way.
But why was Switzerland saved from the yoke of abso-
lutism and in the process its fiscal backwardness pre-
served? To answer this question, a theory is necessary.
Bean’s law,named after the American economic his-
torian Richard Bean (1973), is a good starting point.
In the author’s view large territorial states can be
defended more easily than small fractured domin-
ions as the external perimeter of a dominion grows
linearly, the area however by its square. In large
counties, relatively fewer resources are required to
defend the outer border than in small fractured ter-
ritories. Based on this simple thesis, additional con-
clusions can be drawn (Blankart 2011; 2012). In a
large state the distance to the border is great, and
emigration costs are high. Neighbouring states are
far away so that comparative competition is low.
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Thus the costs of repression for the ruler are low and
taxation is high. In contrast, in a fractured state
migration costs to the border are comparatively low
and comparative competition high. The costs of
repression and taxation are thus comparatively high
and taxation low.
These considerations lead to two basic models: large
states with a natural centralism and fractured states
with a natural federalism that are located next to
each other.Admittedly, geography no longer plays a
central role today.But it is from the geography of the
past that the institutions of today arose.
Apart from the pure cases of natural centralism and
natural federalism, there are, of course, many mixed
forms. However, there is no doubt general agree-
ment that in historical terms, and also for today,
Switzerland is closer to natural federalism than nat-
ural centralism.Switzerland was difficult to conquer,
to rule and to exploit for taxes. The early wars of
independence are proof. The Swiss confederates
were able to maintain their natural federalism and
shake off Austrian rule and taxation. But torn apart
by their federalism, they were unable to conduct
active foreign policy and despite victorious battles in
the 15th century to conquer and rule neighbouring
regions, such as the duchy of Burgundy or Milan.
Nevertheless they were viewed as unconquerable
and thus, in fiscal terms, unattractive. That Switzer-
land broke away from the Holy Roman Empire in
the Peace of Westphalia (1648) was the logical con-
clusion of a long historical development.
Natural federalism as reflected in the mirror of 
history
Later natural federalism also played an important
role in shaping Switzerland.When in 1798 the French
revolutionary troops conquered Switzerland, France
sought to transform Switzerland into a unitary state,
the Helvetian Republic, with a centralised tax sys-
tem. The decentralised feudal burdens were abol-
ished. But the wealth, transport, income and luxury
taxes that were instituted instead did not take hold
in the natural federalism of Switzerland, and the
grand experiment failed. As quickly as five years
later the Helvetian Republic collapsed as a result of
internal chaos, bloody revolts and coup d’états.
Napoleon Bonaparte thus felt it necessary to insti-
tute a new constitution that was less centralistic – a
“mediation constitution”. In particular the centralis-
tic financial constitution,which ran contrary to Swiss
natural federalism, was abolished and the cantons
regained their previous financial autonomy. Instead
of remitting a monetary tax to France, Switzerland
was obligated to provide a non-monetary tax – troops
of 12,000 men (for the Russian campaign, among
others) – which was not less of a burden but was eas-
ier to enforce.3 The mediation constitution lasted for
over ten years. But as soon as Napoleon’s troops
withdrew behind the Rhine at the end of 1813, the
mediation broke apart and the pre-revolutionary
order was re-established excluding, however, the
subordinate relationships among Swiss territories.
Only with a great deal of effort and pressure from
foreign countries was the Swiss confederation able
to establish a constitution, the Bundesakte of 1815.
In it the common defence of the nation was regulat-
ed. It did not include a national customs and tax sys-
tem. The federal government financed itself with
contributions, weighted by wealth, from the cantons.
Federal laws arose only as concordats of the cantons,
membership in which was voluntary.
In 1848, however, a liberal majority of the cantons
brought a violent end to this confederation. Disre-
garding the conservative minority, it established a
federal state and secured for themselves an absolute
majority in both legislative chambers of parliament
and in the executive branch,the Federal Council,for
the next 50 years.
The goal of the liberals was primarily to establish a
common market in all of Switzerland. As a result
customs was declared to be a federal issue as well as
the infrastructure network – streets,bridges,post and
currency. With respect to taxes (except for custom
duty) the cantons remained autonomous. Natural
federalism prevailed. The cantons used their free-
dom and experimented in competition with a num-
ber of tax systems. The economic historian M.
Spoerer (2002) reports on a discussion in Zurich in
which it was debated whether the city could afford
an income and wealth tax that was 80 percent higher
than that in Basle. A considerable number of other
examples indicate that there was intense natural tax
competition.4
Despite cantonal autonomy in taxes and public
expenditure, the liberal majority in the federal gov-
ernment presented a constant threat to the local
3 In addition Switzerland was required to buy 200,000 centners of
French salt annually.
4 Meyers Konversations-Lexikon (1888).authorities, which became evident above all in a cul-
tural struggle and the resulting ban of the Jesuits.
Only a total revision of the federal constitution
could change this situation.This did not happen until
1874.Nevertheless,the revision brought little change
in the political majority and power relationship.The
conservatives only succeeded in including in the con-
stitution an albeit very important federalist institu-
tion – facultative referendums on legislation. For
every federal law which passed the two chambers of
Parliament, 30,000 (today 50,000) voters could
invoke a referendum and thus repeal centralistic and
other unpopular laws with a simple majority. Today
federal referendums on legislation are still very
important, since without a legislative competency of
the federal court, it is the only way to repeal uncon-
stitutional laws.5
As of 1891 an obligatory referendum on the then
introduced possibility of a partial revision of the fed-
eral constitution was conducted. In accordance with
the importance of the matter, a majority of voters
and cantons was necessary. This referendum also
placed an effective barrier to the expansion of the
federal authorities’ competency vis-à-vis the cantons
and thus to undermine the federalism.It is important
that the existence alone of the referendum forced
the federal authorities to take into account the inter-
ests of the voters in the cantons.The effect of the ref-
erendum was similar to that of a fleet in being.
The five phases of centralisation in Switzerland
The referendum can be seen as the last great and
successful effort to halt the growing competencies of
the federal government and to expand federalism.A
series of reforms have followed up to today that
strengthen the federal government at the expense of
the cantons and municipalities. Five stages can be
enumerated:
1. In 1891 the possibility of a popular initiative for
partial revision of the federal constitution was
created. Popular initiatives require 50,000 (now
100,000) signatures and create, if they are accept-
ed by the people and cantons,new federal powers
without the government and parliament having to
take action. They always entail an element of re-
proach, the implication being that the govern-
ment has failed to capture the wishes of the peo-
ple. Most popular initiatives actually fail in prac-
tice, as they do not receive the required qualified
majority of citizens’ and cantons’ votes.However,
like the referendum, its very existence is a re-
minder to the government and parliament to be
vigilant and to read actual or perceived wishes
from the lips of the citizens, or of the press. As a
result counterproposals to the popular initiative
are often presented to the voters.
2. Additionally the proportional electoral system
for the National Council, which has existed since
1919, has positively influenced centralisation.
Instead of a majority party there are now several
minority parties ruling the National Council. In
addition to the liberal party there are parties rep-
resenting farmers, catholic conservatives and
social democrats.The parties all have to establish
a profile by transforming their minority wishes
into majority wishes via logrolling (i.e. together
with other minority parties). The result is that
every coalition formed by the logrolling of two or
more parties leads to the creation of two or more
new federal laws. Centralised regulation is
increasing.
3. To finance defence expenditures, a “military tax”
and a “commodity sales tax”at the wholesale level
were introduced as federal taxes in 1915 and 1941
respectively. Neither of these was repealed later
and both exist today as a “direct federal tax” on
income and a “value added tax” on consumption.
These two taxes are an important source for fi-
nancing the goals agreed by the logrolling coali-
tions arising from the proportional voting system.
The last notable control is the constitutional provi-
sion requiring that these two tax laws be approved
every ten to fifteen years by the people and the
cantons as a whole and, if rejected, are not
renewed.
4. The tax harmonisation law of 1990 represents a
powerful intervention in the canton’s and munic-
ipal tax autonomy.The federal legislator requires
the cantons to levy certain taxes, including an in-
come and wealth tax on natural persons, a profit
and capital tax on legal entities and a withholding
tax from certain natural and juristic entities,and a
real property gains tax.Thus with this federal law
the taxpayer, tax base and tax deductions are
givens.As a result the cantons and municipalities
are only free to determine material taxation i.e.
tax allowances, tax rates and tax exemptions. Tax
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competition is thus intensely focused on these
three parameters and the scope for innovation is
very limited.
5. Furthermore, the federal court has become more
intent on expanding its own interests by extend-
ing its political competency to include federal
laws.It has intervened in the area of material tax-
ation by determining that degressive income tax-
ation (even if in the process the absolute tax bur-
den rises) is incompatible with a the ability-to-pay
principle. It thereby limits the ability of tax-poor
cantons to restore their finances using attractive
tax rates and thus forces them to depend on the
federal government.
Results: federal taxation in Switzerland today
The conditions described above characterise taxa-
tion in Switzerland in five ways:
1. Figure 1 gives the impression of a confused tax
situation.High and low marginal income tax rates
coexist. Rates in Schwyz (SZ) and Zug (ZG) are
very low;Vaud (VD) and Geneva (GE) have very
high marginal rates. It must be kept in mind that
all the columns in Figure 1 assume a fixed base of
11.6 percent of direct federal taxation for the top
tax bracket under consideration. The federal tax
is highly progressive: it begins with an income of
more than 50,000 Swiss francs and a rate of 0.5
percent.The remaining differences in the canton-
al and municipal taxes are expressions of tax com-
petition. Just as competitive markets are always
characterised by different prices due to search
processes, the cantons and municipalities are
characterised by different tax rates in a system of
competitive federalism. For this reason, there are
always smaller discrepancies in tax burdens.Some
people consider this element of tax competition
to be unfair. But because of this competition,
pressure is exerted as a whole on the tax burden,
which would hardly be expected in a tax cartel or
if taxes are set at the federal level.
2. As already mentioned,the tax-harmonisation law
channels tax competition basically in the direc-
tion of tax rates, tax allowances and some tax
exemptions. The law allows little scope for other
tax niches. Therefore, tax competition in these
areas is particularly intense. It could even assume
oligopolistic features if the number of cantons
were smaller. If, on the other hand, the cantons
had more freedom in the design of taxation, com-
petition could have more of the character of niche
competition with possibly lower rate differentials.
3. On the map in Figure 2 (Feld 2009) and taking into
account the central locations in Switzerland,
Krugman’s law becomes apparent according to
which central locations can afford higher taxes,
while peripheral locations must have lower taxes in
order to have a chance to develop (Krugman
1997).Thus,Zurich (ZH) has high taxes in compar-
ison to the surrounding cantons of Schwyz (SZ),
Zug (ZG) as well as Obwalden and Nidwalden
(OW and NW). On the other hand, Fribourg (FR)
as a non-central location has lower taxes than Bern
(BE),Vaud (VD) and Neuchâtel (NE).
4. It is not uninteresting to note in Table 1 that the
Swiss cantons, on average, have balanced budgets
or even surpluses.
5. Finally, the particular features
of the dynamics of tax compe-
tition are pointed out in the lit-
erature.The self-employed,for
example, react more strongly
to lower tax burdens than sa-
laried workers and retirees;
young, well-educated Swiss re-
act more strongly than older
residents. But also the cantons
react to tax rate differences:
the lower the tax burden in the
neighbouring canton,the more
a canton lowers its own taxes.
A decline in public services
has not yet been observed (for















































































































































































































Source:  Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung (
%
a) Marginal burden by federal, cantonal, municipal and church taxes in the canton capital for incomes 
between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Swiss francs.
(b) Appenzell Outer Rhodes.       (c) Appenzell Inner Rhodes.
MARGINAL TAX BURDEN OF GROSS INCOME
a)
married individual with two children in 2009
 Swiss Federal Finance Administration,2011).
Figure 1Individual responsibility: the advantage of being
disfavoured
The results in Table 1 need further explanation.The
inter-cantonal and inter-municipal tax competition
results in lower taxes. However, the cantonal and
municipal governments do not let themselves be
pushed into a low-tax policy at any price.Public debt
is not seen as a way out. How can this be explained?
How is it that the Swiss cantons,despite competition,
have quite satisfactory public budget results and on
average take on hardly any new debt, whereas in
other countries local governments especially run up
debts on a large scale? The riddle is not solved by
asserting that politicians in Switzerland are particu-
larly responsible. Instead, this raises the question of
what incentives there are that induce Swiss politi-
cians to behave comparatively responsibly.
Usually this is attributed to the
existing debt brakes which are
supported by direct democracy in
many cantons (Kirschgässner 2004;
Feld and Kirchgässner 2008). But
what is behind the debt brakes?
Why have politicians and voters
imposed such limits on them-
selves, and why do they stick to
them? The governments of the
EU countries also have debt
brakes. They are required to ad-
here to the deficit and debt limits
of the Stability and Growth Pact.
But their budget discipline is
weak. Currently, most EU coun-
tries exceed the current deficit
and debt limits. The same is the
case for the governments of the
German federal states. They are
supposed to follow the “golden
rule”, which requires that the
annual budget deficit should not exceed the level of
investment, before in 2020 a zero-debt limit takes
effect. But this rule is often flouted already today.
This is not surprising,since behind these debt brakes
is the implicit promise of the federal government to
rescue the state authorities should they not succeed
in applying the debt brake.
In Switzerland, the cantons and their voters are in a
different position.They know that if they fail to bal-
ance their budgets and encounter financial difficul-
ties no one will rescue them. When the cantons of
Bern, Solothurn, Geneva, Vaud, Appenzell Ausser-
rhoden and Glarus got into trouble in the 1990s due
to the large losses of their cantonal banks, they were
on their own.The question whether the federal gov-
ernment would provide financial help was not even
raised. Instead, the Confederation and the cantons
assumed that the no-bailout principle applied,
whereby each canton is responsible for its own
finances.6
But why would the Confederation not help the can-
tons in financial trouble? The answer is because it
cannot pass on its debt to third parties. The
Confederation itself does not belong to a contractu-
al system (such as the euro group), which could res-
cue it if necessary.Rather,it is well aware that no for-
eign state whatsoever will rescue it in case of a finan-































CANTONAL AND (WEIGHTED) LOCAL INCOME TAX BURDEN
FOR A MARRIED INDIVIDUAL WITH TWO CHILDREN AND
A NET INCOME OF ONE MILLION FRANCS IN 2006
Table 1 













 Source: Swiss Federal Finance Administration.
Source: Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung (Swiss Federal Finance Admini-
stration) according to Feld (2009).
6 Of course private,systemic large banks such as the UBS were res-
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cial crisis. On the contrary, many would be pleased if
the successful and hated little state of Switzerland
were to do poorly for a change. But unpopularity
also has an advantage. The no-bailout principle for
the federal government is inevitable.The only polit-
ical option is to conduct a solid budget policy and
thus to establish a good reputation in the minds of
the financial market actors,which is then reflected in
favourable interest rates for government bonds.The
debt brakes which were introduced by the govern-
ment itself are aimed at providing a signal of the
government’s fiscal reliability to the financial mar-
kets. And in fact they are largely being complied
with.7,8
Just as the Confederation is subject to a no-bailout
principle so too the cantons have to follow this prin-
ciple. The Confederation cannot afford to provide
financial support to the cantons without endangering
its own rating. Thus the cantons have to conduct an
earnest budget policy just as the Confederation does,
so as to signal their reliability to the credit markets.
For the cantons the debt brakes also have the func-
tion of signalling to the credit market that their fiscal
policy is in order. The dividends they thereby earn
are indicated in their budget surpluses as shown in
Table 1.
The no-bailout principle also protects the cantons
against interference by the Confederation.If the fed-
eral government interferes too much in the policies
of the cantons,it also must assume responsibility,i.e.,
ultimately assume a bailout. Most Swiss politicians
are afraid to take this step. In Germany, in contrast,
the concept of federal-state interweavement was
adopted as a constitutional principle in 1969 with the
result that in the event of a financial emergency the
federal government can hardly avoid being drawn
into granting a bailout.
The ability of federalism to correct mistakes: the
no-bailout principle and debt breaks 
Institutions only survive in federalism when they are
consistently successful. In Switzerland the canton
governments must continually be vigilant and moni-
tor their institutions in order to survive in intercan-
tonal competition. That is why mistakes are elimi-
nated more quickly in federalism than in centralistic
systems.An example will illustrate this point:
The federal and canton governments have clearly
recognised that no-bailout and debt brakes are com-
plementary instruments.The two instruments support
each other and thus have to be implemented in com-
bination. The governments of the euro states were
also of this opinion in 1999 when the Stability and
Growth Pact was established, in addition to the al-
ready existing no-bailout clause (Art. 125 AEUV) in
the Treaty of Amsterdam. But soon these principles
were no longer taken so seriously. Without the com-
petition of currencies,every member state of the euro
zone was hoping to rely on the other member states.
That functioned for a while until in the wake of the
Greek crisis the belief in both principles collapsed.
Today, after the Greece crisis, the European Council
and Commission do not appear to see the debt brake
and no-bailout principle as complementary but
rather only as substitutive instruments. Both author-
ities have stated that they will no longer use the no-
bailout clause 125 AEUV of the Lisbon Treaty to its
full extent. Instead, following the suggestions of the
Van Rompuy working groups they intend to
strengthen the debt brake contained in the Stability
and Growth Pact. This policy fails to recognise the
complementarity of both instruments. If there is not
a no-bailout principle behind the Stability and
Growth Pact, the latter loses its credibility. A mem-
ber state can speculate that if it does not succeed in
fulfilling the requirements of the Stability and
Growth Pact, it will be bailed out.This is in fact the
plan of the new European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), which gives priority to the debt brake fol-
lowed by liquidity help before a possible debt re-
structuring. The opposite order would, however, be
the credible one: first a debt restructuring, and then,
if necessary, liquidity help.
It is at this point that federalist competition is miss-
ing, which would immediately punish an action such
as that of the ESM and introduce a self-correcting
mechanism. The euro states can – for the moment
with impunity – embark on a dismal path well aware
that their policy is not sustainable. Economists have
pointed out the dangers of this endeavour.In a mixed
times series cross-section analysis for 43 OECD
countries, E. R. Fasten (2011) has shown that the
observance of debt limits as described above dimin-
7The Swiss federal constitution also assumes a no-bailout principle.
According to Art. 44 BV, the cantons are in fact required to help;
however they are not obligated to monitor and thus are not liable
for each other.
8 Furthermore, debt brakes help the federal government defend
their responsible budget policy vis-à-vis the interest groups of
domestic policy. The establishment of debt breaks in a direct
democracy grants them legitimacy.ishes if they are no longer autonomous and support-
ed by a no-bailout policy but rather imposed upon by
the central government and thus indicative of a pos-
sible bailout. Furthermore, the budget discipline
continues to increase if there is a move towards a
unitary state. This makes sense because in a unitary
state the territorial sub-divisions have all lost their
autonomy. As administrative units their only task is
simply to spend the money allocated to them from
above for the determined purposes on a one-to-one
basis.Acquiring a debt is forbidden.If the euro states
were to experience that their debt brake (without a
no-bailout principle) would not be successful, their
only choice would be to join the march towards a
unitary state. This is the nightmare I see coming to-
wards us.Everything that we in Europe appreciate in
terms of cultural diversity and wealth of ideas, all
that defines Europe – from science to the perform-
ing and fine arts – is threatened by Brussels’ bureau-
cracy in a unitary state.9
The Debacle of Leukerbad: A Greek Default en
miniature
“Europe is at present a copy at large of what Greece
was formerly a pattern in miniature”, David Hume
wrote in 1742. His admiration for Greece was great.
But that somehow a bankruptcy of Greece at the
time would affect Europe in any way never occurred
to him.He was absolutely right on this point and this
should also be the case today. Greek GDP compris-
es only 2 percent of EU GDP, its government per-
haps only 1 percent and a Greek default would be
only about 1/2 percent of EU GDP.Actually, a quan-
tité négligeable. Nevertheless, the tiny Greek crisis
has turned into a European crisis.The reason, in my
opinion, is that the self-correcting mechanisms of
federalism have been deliberately set aside. Again,
there are important lessons to be learned from Swiss
federalism.
It is little known that Switzerland has its own Greece
“en miniature” – the municipality of community
Leukerbad,a small town in the canton of Valais with
1700 inhabitants in 1998.In terms of size Leukerbad,
roughly speaking, is to Switzerland and the Swiss
banking sector what Greece is to the euro zone and
the euro banking sector. Leukerbad wanted to be-
come the greatest and most modern Spa in Switzer-
land if not in Europe.After a series of high-flying in-
vestment projects, primarily for the tourist industry
with the corresponding (partly fraudulent) debts,the
municipal council of Leukerbad declared insolvency
and went into state receivership on 21 October 1998.
Why did the creditors allow matters to go this far?
Did they mistakenly assume that there would be a
government bailout? This is unlikely, because there
is a bankruptcy law for municipalities that regulates
in detail the modalities for the debt restructuring of
insolvent municipalities.10 And even if there mistak-
enly had been bail-out expectations, it would have
been canton Valais’ responsibility to oversee the fi-
nancial situation of the municipality of Leukerbad.
It obviously failed to do so, otherwise the debacle
would not have occurred.A more plausible explana-
tion is a failure of control of Leukerbad’s finances on
the part of the creditors.With the unusual size of the
debt, 346 million Swiss francs, and the complexity of
the credit relationships with intertwined creditors,11
the control problem turned into a public-goods pro-
blem. None of the creditors wanted to bear the con-
trolling costs alone, each of them relied on the oth-
ers,and since to that point there had never been pro-
blems with municipal financing, the public authori-
ties also failed to undertake major action.The finan-
cial situation worsened until Leukerbad became
insolvent.12
What should the creditors do in this situation? Unlike
in a private bankruptcy procedure,they were not able
to break up the municipality. Only a few assets were
left to liquidate. Instead, the creditors strove for an
assumption of the debts by the canton Valais. Its gov-
ernment, however, rejected any responsibility for the
debacle, which induced the creditors to take the case
to the Federal Court in Lausanne.
In Switzerland, the problem was resolved federalis-
ticly. If, on the contrary, the approach had been cen-
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9 On 14 June 2010 and again on 21 July 2011 Chancellor Merkel
reafirmed that we need “a stronger economic government than we
now have”.A common European economic government,a binding
debt brake for all euro countries and a financial transaction tax are
planned. On 3 June 2011 ECB President J. C .Trichet advocated a
common euro finance ministry.
10 Federal Debt Collection Act vis-à-vis municipalities and other
entities of cantonal public law of 4 December 1947 (2006) compa-
rable to Chapter 9 U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
11 Including Credit Suisse, insurance companies, municipalities,
Migros, von Roll, ESG.
12 A key role was played by the “emission centres of the Swiss
municipalities” (ESG) as loan brokers, since the packaged munici-
pal loans into larger bundles and offered them to the banks, which
in turn were able to place the larger lots more successfully and thus
grant more favourable interest rates and conditions. As a result,
with the ESG there was thus a two-tier principal-agent problem,by
which the controlling problem was made even worse.As a result of
Leukerbad, the ESG became insolvent and was forced to cease
activities until they were finally taken over by Credit Suisse on 17
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tralistic, as in Greece, the federal
government in Berne would have
said: Leukerbad could trigger a
banking crisis, so we must save
Leukerbad from collapse so that
the creditor banks, including Cre-
dit Suisse (CSFB), do not go
bankrupt. But this never hap-
pened. The Federal Court was
courageous.It sided with the posi-
tion of the government of the can-
ton of Valais and dismissed the
suit brought by Credit Suisse
(CSFB) and the other lenders.The
no-bailout principle was enforced
with no “ifs” and “buts”.13
The no-bailout course was clearly the right way to
go. With its verdict, the Court gave a very clear sig-
nal. It is up to the creditors to examine the actual
creditworthiness of their borrowers. But how were
the creditors able to get reliable information, given
the often complex relationships on the true situation
of the debtor? There was a demand for credit infor-
mation but no supply. But due to market forces, this
gap became occupied by a private credit rating agen-
cy and several rating departments of large banks in
the years following the Leukerbad debacle. They
assess the creditworthiness of municipalities accord-
ing to their finances and the possible bailout or no-
bailout expectations, depending on the constitutions
of the cantons in which they are located. In addition
credit ratings for cantons were developed.14 The Fe-
deral Court’s verdict not only prevented Leu-
kerbad’s bailout, but it helped new institutions to
arise from the bankruptcy, rating agencies, which
helped to overcome the existing market failure. It
would have been difficult for government to have
achieved such a reform so swiftly. Had the Federal
Court forced Canton Valais to assume the debt, the
opportunity to implement an institutional reform
would have been abandoned (Figure 3). Or put
another way, if the European Commission had stud-
ied the case of Leukerbad in good time, it would
probably have made more successful decisions in the
case of Greece.
Conclusions
For a long time,Switzerland was not a special case in
Europe. In the Ancien Regime, Switzerland, with its
13 traditional states, was very much in line with the
governance system of the time, especially the Holy
Roman Empire, with its 327 autonomous states and
territories. But Switzerland was also a useful com-
plement to the great powers, France and Great
Britain. Furthermore, even with the reorganisation
of Europe after the Congress of Vienna,the pluralis-
tic European world of states remained by and large
intact, with Switzerland in the middle.
New paths were embarked on with European unifi-
cation after the Second World War. Competition
among the companies of the different countries of
Europe was to be governed by fixed, European Un-
ion-wide rules.The European Commission was able
to achieve competitive markets without having to
take into consideration the protectionist concerns of
individual interest groups. But with the completion
of the Single Market in 1992, the Commission’s role
was largely fulfilled. What still remains is a largely
non-functional bureaucracy not subject to democra-
tic controls that with its regulations seeks to consoli-
date its position within and outside of the European
Union.
Switzerland has also been affected by this develop-
ment though not a member state of the European
Union. It is interested in deepening bilateral trade
relations with the European Union. But the Com-
mission’s negotiating doctrine requires that Switzer-
land first adopt EU law before talks can begin about
free trade and the freedom of establishment for
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13 On the Leukerbad case, see Blankart and Klaiber (2003; 2004,
2006) and Blankart and Fasten (2009).
14 In May 2011, of the 26 cantons seven received the highest rating:
AAA. In the AA segment were 15 cantons and only four were
rated with a single A (Source:Aargau Cantonal Bank).companies. Switzerland, on the other hand, refuses
to grant unsecured concessions in EU law without
having achieved free-trade concessions. It would
like to negotiate this step by step, which the EU
Commission rejects.The Commission rightly argues
that Switzerland would have to adopt EU law in any
case (for example,the chemical directives REACH)
if it does not want to lose all of its markets in the
EU. For the Commission it is a matter of applying
sufficient pressure on Switzerland. The EU Com-
mission, in turn, is not willing to admit that some-
what more competition from the outside would also
be good for its own industry. And so Switzerland
remains an unpopular special case in an increasing-
ly organised Europe.
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